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It used to seem so easy. After Professors Arthur von Mehren and
Donald Trautman wrote their celebrated article, 1 we came to accept
that there were two kinds of jurisdiction, general and specific. If the
defendant entered into the state and committed a tort, this gave rise
to specific jurisdiction in that state's courts. If the defendant merely
conducted unrelated business in the forum, jurisdiction was necessarily
"general." In the latter case, jurisdiction was harder to establish
because the quantum of unrelated contacts sufficient to establish gen-
eral jurisdiction was greater than the quantum required for specific
jurisdiction. Supreme Court cases seemed to reflect this dichotomy
between general and specific jurisdiction fairly nicely. 2
It's not so simple any more. The question whether general or
specific jurisdiction is at issue is still of major importance, because it
remains true that more substantial contacts must be shown if general
jurisdiction is sought.3 What is considerably less clear is whether, in
particular cases, the relevant basis for authority is general or specific.
Professors von Mehren and Trautman did not address this issue,
perhaps because it seemed at the time that the difference was fairly
clear and intuitively obvious. Yet, as is typically the case with legal
categories, borderline cases find their way into the courts as soon as
a dichotomy is established. We find ourselves now with disputes in
which it is far from clear whether jurisdiction, if it exists, is general
or specific. 4 Because this characterization determines the quantum of
contacts that must be shown, uncertainty on this issue infects the
Nathan Baker Professor of Law, Yale University. The author wishes to thank Professor
Mary Twitchell for good humor and scholarly openness that is rarely encountered in such
response/rejoinder episodes.
I See von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HAIiV.
L. REv. 1121 (1966).
2 Compare McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 ('957) (finding a single
insurance contract adequate to support jurisdiction where the cause of action was based on that
contract) with Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (finding substantial
unrelated contacts adequate for jurisdiction).
3 See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 4o8, 45 n.xo (1984)
(requiring "continuous and systematic" contacts because parties conceded that the case did not
"arise out of" and was not "related to" forum contacts).
4 See, e.g., Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (198o) (finding an insurance policy insufficiently
related to the dispute to satisfy the requirements of Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. x86 (x977));
Cornelison v. Chaney, i6 Cal. 3d 143, 545 P.2d 264, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1976) (extending
personal jurisdiction although accident occurred not in the forum but as defendant was driving
towards it).
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RELATED CONTACTS
entire jurisdictional analysis. When some contacts exist but are not
"continuous and systematic," 5 whether jurisdiction exists at all de-
pends upon whether general or specific jurisdiction analysis is em-
ployed.
Enter Professor Mary Twitchell. In her recent article in this Re-
view, she seeks to clarify what ought to count as general jurisdiction,
and what ought to count as specific. 6 She also traces the background
of the two concepts, explores the literature discussing them, and an-
alyzes their application in recent cases. Although much of what she
says is new and useful, I take issue with her on several major points.
Speaking generally, I have my doubts about how much help her
analysis provides, interesting as it is. In addition, at some of the
points where she comes close to making concrete recommendations, I
think she departs from both sound intuition and Supreme Court prec-
edent.
The overall problem concerns Professor Twitchell's failure to ex-
plain the foundation for the different treatment of general and specific
jurisdiction. We need a fairly precise explanation before we can de-
termine the proper disposition of litigation that has some marginal
connection to the state. Let me illustrate what I think is a common
intuition about the difference between general and specific jurisdiction
by using an example. Assume that a defendant who lives in New
York travels by car to Massachusetts and there injures a pedestrian.
This is an easy case for "specific jurisdiction" in Massachusetts. If
the plaintiff tries to sue in Florida, however, this would not be a case
of specific jurisdiction: if there were jurisdiction at all, it would be
general. Consequently, the plaintiff would have to show a continuous
and systematic connection between the defendant and Florida. Again,
this seems an easy case to classify.
But what if the plaintiff attempts to sue in Connecticut or Maine
on the grounds that the defendant drove through Connecticut on the
way to Massachusetts, or was in Massachusetts on the way to Maine?
These two cases seem much harder to classify. They do not seem to
fit within von Mehren and Trautman's paradigm of specific jurisdic-
tion. On the other hand, there does seem to be some sort of relation-
ship between the dispute and these two states. It is precisely in
unravelling the nature of this relationship that Professor Twitchell
leaves us without guidance. Yet, obviously, a great deal turns on
whether our case is one of general or specific jurisdiction, because -
especially under her view - a substantially higher quantum of con-
tacts is necessary to satisfy the former test than is necessary to satisfy
the latter.7
Perkins, 342 U.S. at 438.
6 See Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, ioi HARV. L. REV. 6io (1988).
In the final section of her article, Professor Twitchell suggests that general jurisdiction
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
In some respects, it might be argued that Connecticut and Maine
are in as strong a position to assert jurisdiction as Massachusetts,
where all of us would agree that jurisdiction is proper. The defendant
purposefully availed herself of the benefits of Connecticut law by
driving through the state just as much as she purposefully availed
herself of Massachusetts law.8 Her insurance will cover a defense in
Connecticut or Maine just as surely as it will cover her defense in
Massachusetts. Yet whether or not one believes that it would be
unconstitutional for Maine or Connecticut to assert adjudicative au-
thority over this dispute, it seems undeniable that their case is a much
harder one to make than that of Massachusetts. But why? Our
intuition must depend somehow on the different functions that general
and specific jurisdiction fulfill, and thus on some foundational dis-
tinction. We will return to this problem after investigating the analysis
that Professor Twitchell herself proposes.
I. DISPUTE-BLIND AND DISPUTE-SPECIFIC JURISDICTION
Much of Professor Twitchell's analysis concerns her proposal for
a new terminology. Rather than using the terms "general" and "spe-
cific," which she thinks mislead courts and scholars, she would have
us use the terms "dispute-blind" and "dispute-specific. "9 Dispute-blind
jurisdiction exists when a court would have adjudicative jurisdiction
over any cause of action whatsoever against this defendant, or at
least, as she sometimes qualifies this, over "most" disputes. 10 A find-
ing of dispute-specific jurisdiction, in contrast, does not compel the
conclusion that jurisdiction would exist in most or all other cases;
instead, as Professor Twitchell sometimes states, it takes the "nature"
of the dispute into account."
Although I have no problem with this particular terminology, I
fail to see why it is any clearer than "general" and "specific." If
Professor Twitchell is correct that courts have not always applied the
general and specific terminology correctly, this does not necessarily
mean that they will do any better with alternative terms. In addition,
it is not clear why she prefers either of these pairs of terms to juris-
diction over "related" or "unrelated" causes of action. The Supreme
Court has a much longer history of phrasing things in terms of relat-
typically ought to be limited to the defendant's home base. See id. at 667-70. Specific juris-
diction would therefore be the only basis for jurisdiction in Connecticut or Maine.
8 The purposeful availment standard has been applied in numerous Supreme Court cases.
See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (i98o); Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
9 See Twitchell, supra note 6, at 613.
1o See id. at 637.
"1 See id. at 613.
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edness or connectedness than in terms of general and specific juris-
diction. 12
More important, though, is the fact that phrasing things in terms
of either the general/specific or the dispute-blind/dispute-specific ter-
minology is not very helpful in analyzing particular cases. Let's as-
sume that there is a defendant that has some connection with the
forum, but not a continuous and systematic one. Whether jurisdiction
exists thus depends upon whether there is an adequate nexus between
the forum and the controversy such that "dispute-specific" jurisdiction
is appropriate. Using Professor Twitchell's own terminology, how is
one to make that determination?
At the outset one might note two different possible interpretations
of her terms. The first is relatively clear: jurisdiction is dispute-blind
if there would be jurisdiction over all or most cases brought against
this defendant; if one can imagine cases against this defendant where
jurisdiction would not exist, then jurisdiction is dispute-specific.' 3
Professor Twitchell's argument that jurisdiction was dispute-specific
in the Helicopteros case, for example, proceeds by showing that one
can imagine another case against that particular defendant in which
the forum court would not have. asserted jurisdiction. 14 The second
interpretation, is broader: jurisdiction is dispute-specific if it is "based
in any way on the nature of the Icontroversy."5
The first interpretation makes the definition of Professor Twitch-
ell's terms relatively precise, but presents three closely related prob-
lems. First, the court must express an opinion on many jurisdictional
questions that are not actually before it. Would there be jurisdiction
over the defendant if he or she were involved in a contract case in
another state? In an automobile accident entirely across the country?
12 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (i945), for instance, spoke in
terms of claims "aris[ing] out of" or "connected with" the state. The "general/specific" phrase-
ology seems not to have been employed until Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466
U.S. 408, 44 nn.8 & 9 (I984).
13 Professor Twitchell's discussion suggests this sort of definition when she says that "the
crucial" question as to whether dispute-blind jurisdiction exists is whether jurisdiction would be
"fair for most causes of action," or would exist over "any claim." Twitchell, supra note 6, at
637 (emphasis in original). One might infer from this that jurisdiction is "dispute-specific" when
it would not also exist over all other, or most other, claims.
14 In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984), Texas was asked
to assert jurisdiction over a Colombian corporation (Helicol) that had done business in Texas
for several years. The basis of the cause of action was a helicopter crash in Peru that killed
four American passengers. The helicopter had been purchased by Helicol from a Texas firm
and was being used under contract to transport the American employees of a Texas-based
consortium. The Texas Supreme Court asserted general jurisdiction over Helicol because of its
"numerous and substantial" contacts with the forum. See Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, 638 S.W.2d 870, 874 (Tex. 1982). The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. See Helicop-
teros, 466 U.S. at 419.
Is See Twitchell, supra note 6, at 613.
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
Only after the court resolves such questions can it know whether its
jurisdiction is dispute-blind or dispute-specific. Professor Twitchell's
Helicopteros discussion illustrates this point, because she must ex-
amine various other hypothetical cases before deciding whether juris-
diction is dispute-blind. This complicates the jurisdictional investi-
gation by requiring some sort of global analysis of all potential
jurisdictional issues against the same individual.
Second, and more important, in order to characterize the issue as
dispute-blind or dispute-specific, the court must already know whether
jurisdiction exists in those other cases. The problem is not just that
in considering all hypothetical possibilities the court will be distracted
from the problem actually before it. The larger difficulty is that when
the court becdrnes thus engaged, it must have some prior notion about
whether jurisdiction exists on such facts. A characterization of juris-
diction as dispute-blind or dispute-specific can be made only after one
identifies which causes of action might be brought against the defen-
dant in the forum. The characterization, in other words, depends
upon knowing whether due process allows jurisdiction over such other
cases. Not only does this require that one have the answer to that
question already, but it also risks circularity. To know whether due
process would be violated by asserting jurisdiction over the case at
hand, one must know whether it would be violated by asserting
jurisdiction over hypothetical cases. But to know whether jurisdiction
would be permissible over hypothetical cases, one must know whether
it was permissible in the case at hand.
Third, this definition would treat as dispute-specific any assertion
of jurisdiction that differentiated between actions brought against the
defendant, allowing jurisdiction in some cases but not others. The
criterion for differentiation could be completely arbitrary, such as
whether the plaintiff had attended high school in the forum or whether
the dispute was filed on a Monday. A jurisdictional test that required
the plaintiff to have attended high school in the forum would not
allow jurisdiction in all or most cases brought against a particular
defendant. Would jurisdiction over such cases be, for that reason,
dispute-specific? Professor Twitchell certainly would not want to say
so, even though she suggests at one point (somewhat puzzlingly) that
the Constitution does not require any particular degree of claim-
relatedness for assertions of jurisdiction.16
For these reasons, the second interpretation of Professor Twitch-
ell's "dispute-blind"/"dispute-specific" terminology is probably more
faithful to her meaning. The problem with this interpretation, how-
ever, is its imprecision. Asking whether jurisdiction is "based in any
way on the nature of the controversy" is considerably more vague
16 See id. at 656.
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RELATED CONTACTS
than asking merely whether the state would treat some cases differ-
ently from others. If a state has a different long-arm statute for torts
cases than it has for contracts cases, is the decision based on "the
nature of the controversy"? Is the place where the plaintiff went to
high school part of the "nature of the dispute"? What, for that matter,
is "the nature of the dispute"? Professor Twitchell seems to be asking
for some meaningful connection between the forum and the dispute
without telling us what makes a connection meaningful.
Moreover, her "nature of the dispute" criterion is just as unhelpful
as a test of whether the forum would treat different causes of action
differently. An assertion of jurisdiction is said to be dispute-specific
if it was influenced by the nature of the decision, but this does not
help a judge who is trying to figure out which way to decide. The
characterization depends on an ex post evaluation of whether the
nature of the dispute actually influenced the jurisdictional determi-
nation.17 What due process asks ex ante, however, is whether it
should.
For Professor Twitchell, this may not be much of a problem.
Perhaps she expects us to have well-developed intuitions about when
jurisdiction is appropriate and when it is not.18 By consulting such
intuitions, we can ask whether the forum would have jurisdiction over
all other cases involving the same defendant or whether the nature of
the case influences our beliefs about whether jurisdiction is appropri-
ate. If there is jurisdiction over all cases, the forum's jurisdiction in
this case is dispute-blind; if the nature of the case influences the
jurisdictional determination, its jurisdiction is dispute-specific. No-
tice, however, that the "dispute-blind" or "dispute-specific" categori-
zation occurs only after such jurisdictional evaluation occurs. It does
not help a court decide whether jurisdiction actually exists on a par-
ticular set of facts.
In all fairness, Professor Twitchell may be making a somewhat
different point. First, it is possible that she is less concerned with
recommending particular results in particular cases than with insisting
that the court be clear about what it is actually doing. For instance,
she criticizes some courts for characterizing as "general" assertions of
jurisdiction that she thinks are "specific." 19 She admits that she might
17 See id. at 644.
1s Professor Twitchell suggests, for instance, what she thinks the Texas court in Helicopteros
would have done in other cases involving the same defendant. See id. at 642. Of course, there
is an obvious problem here: the mere fact that the Texas court would have denied jurisdiction
over other cases involving the same defendant does not mean that they would have been right
to do so. Nor does it necessarily mean (even if they were right) that dispute-specific jurisdiction
would be appropriate in the litigation that actually arose, for it is entirely possible that Texas
had no jurisdiction over any case involving that defendant. See supra note 14 and accompanying
text.
19 Professor Twitchell refers to such characterizations as "conditional general jurisdiction"
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
approve the identical result if characterized differently, and concedes
that what is at stake may merely be labelling.20 Analytical honesty
and intellectual clarity may make it worth devising new terminology,
even if it only re-categorizes cases that have already been decided.
Second, the dispute-blind characterization arguably helps to re-
solve cases even if judges do not have well-developed and accurate
prior intuitions about whether jurisdiction exists. While a judge might
not be able to determine exactly whether jurisdiction exists in all
cases, he or she might nonetheless have intuitions about whether some
cases for jurisdiction are stronger than others and about whether the
nature of the case influences the result. Even if a judge cannot explain
the standard for jurisdiction, he or she can nevertheless determine
that specific (and not general) jurisdiction is at stake if intuition sug-
gests that the case at hand displays a stronger basis for jurisdiction
than would other cases brought against the same defendant.
This is no excuse, however, for our failure as scholars to address
these questions. The role of the scholar ought to be to bring such
intuitions out into the open and to evaluate them critically. Even if
judges use unexplained intuitions to determine whether general or
specific jurisdiction is at stake, scholars should probe deeper. For the
scholar, it is not enough merely to say, in the Helicopteros case, for
example, that jurisdiction is specific because the judge would not have
asserted jurisdiction over different cases brought against the same
defendant. There would not be much point in writing about these
things if, in the final analysis, we were to take at face value all of
the judge's intuitions.
What really matters, of course, is precisely one's concept of what
makes a case a stronger candidate for forum jurisdiction. What are
the appropriate criteria for ranking various assertions of jurisdiction
over the same defendant? Which of the disputes in which the defen-
dant might become embroiled are sufficiently connected to the forum
that jurisdiction is appropriate, even though the defendant is not
subject to the state's authority in all of his or her other activities?
The virtue of the Supreme Court's phrasing of the analysis - that
the dispute must arise out of forum activities, or be related or con-
nected to the forum 2' - is that it focuses attention upon the necessary
nexus between the forum and the dispute. The general/specific juris-
diction dichotomy is useful primarily after this test for jurisdiction has
been applied.
and argues that they are better conceived of as dispute-specific. See Twitchell, supra note 6,
at 612.
20 See id. at 642-43.
21 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (x945).
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II. THE REQUISITE CONNECTION
Professor Twitchell is fairly quiet about what she thinks the req-
uisite connection between forum and dispute ought to be. At one
point she suggests that "[i]f the claim has some connection with the
defendant's forum contacts, the court must consider the nature of the
claim in deciding the jurisdiction question .... If the court's decision
to exercise jurisdiction is colored by the nature of the claim, its
decision is one of specific jurisdiction." 22 Under this formulation, the
clearly crucial question is whether there is an adequate constitutional
nexus between the forum and the litigation such that dispute-specific
analysis is appropriate.
What kind of nexus counts as "some connection" for Professor
Twitchell's purposes? This is, of course, precisely the problem that
was raised at the outset by our hypothetical about the automobile
accident in Massachusetts. Our intuition that Massachusetts has a
very strong claim to assert jurisdiction, that Florida has no claim
(unless there are substantial enough contacts for general jurisdiction),
and that the claims of Connecticut and Maine fall somewhere in
between is an intuition about the proper sort of nexus upon which
specific jurisdiction must be predicated. In an earlier article, I sug-
gested that the reason that Massachusetts has such a strong claim is
that events relevant to the substance of the dispute occurred there. 23
In contrast, nothing of substantive relevance occurred in Florida,
Maine, or Connecticut; if jurisdiction exists in those states, it must be
general jurisdiction based upon continuous and systematic contacts.
Professor Twitchell's rejection of my analysis depends in part upon
some misconceptions about what the requirement of substantive rel-
evance entails. First, she seems to assume that I am requiring that
the cause of action "directly arise" out of occurrences in the forum. 24
In fact, I never used the phrase "directly arise" although I did speak
of cases "arising" out of the forum activities or forum property. This
seemingly minor addition of the word "directly" is actually significant.
First, it allows her to claim that my test is not based upon Supreme
Court precedent. 25 Although she concedes the Court's use of the
phrase "arises out of," her paraphrase of my language implies that my
test is more stringent than the Court's because it adds the requirement
of directness. Second, it suggests that my test is unusually stringent,
because mere "arising out of" will not satisfy it. Because one of
22 Twitchell, supra note 6, at 679-8o.
23 See Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction,
ig8o Sup. CT. REV. 77, 82-88.
24 See Twitchell, supra note 6, at 654.
2S See id.
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Professor Twitchell's objections to my test is precisely that it requires
too close a connection between the forum and the dispute, the addition
of the word "directly" is misleading.
A second respect in which Professor Twitchell misconceives my
position is that she assumes that cases of specific jurisdiction, as I
define them, are necessarily those in which the forum is required to
apply its own law.2 6 She points out that this cannot be correct because
the Supreme Court has expressly stated that the right to adjudicate is
not the same as the right to apply one's own law, and vice versa.
The claim that she refutes, however, is not a claim that I have ever
made. She infers that I require that a state apply its own law from
the fact that I base specific jurisdiction upon the forum's claim to
regulate occurrences and property within its own territory. 27 This,
however, assumes that the only way to regulate an occurrence is to
apply one's own law.
To the contrary, it is entirely reasonable to speak of the exercise
of adjudicatory authority as itself a form of regulation. Indeed, Pro-
fessor Twitchell herself uses the term "regulating" in this way.28 Re-
gardless of terminology, the point is that the forum is engaged in
enforcing the applicable legal norms (whether foreign or domestic)
with regard to local occurrences implicated in the plaintiff's request
for legal redress.
More generally, Professor Twitchell suggests that the requirement
of substantive relevance is unclear.2 9 Obviously the initial exposition
of the idea was not as clear as it should have been, or it would not
have provoked the misunderstandings that it has. In the next two
sections of this article, I will explore the substantive relevance test in
greater depth, in order to clarify its contours and expose some areas
of disagreement (and, perhaps, agreement) between myself and my
critics. In unpacking the notion of substantive relevance, I will dif-
ferentiate between a stronger and a weaker form of the requirement.
The weaker form, I suspect, would be much more acceptable to
Professor Twitchell; indeed, it represents one common intuition about
the nexus upon which specific jurisdiction depends. After setting it
out, I will return to the stronger version and argue in favor of it.
III. WEAK SUBSTANTIVE RELEVANCE: CONNECTION TO THE PLOT
Imagine that you are a torts professor, telling the story of World-
Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson.3 0 Many torts professors, it seems, are
26 See id. at 654-55.
27 See id. at 655.
28 See id. at 647 (referring to the forum's interest in regulating behavior within its borders
and assuming that only forum choice of law rules will apply).
29 See id. at 656-57.
30 444 U.S. 286 (i98o).
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RELATED CONTACTS
entirely innocent of any interest in subjects like personal jurisdiction,
so assume that you are telling it simply from a products liability
standpoint and are not concerned with questions about the appropriate
forum in which to litigate. Perhaps you are interested in the problem
of liability for design defects; perhaps you are concerned about con-
tributory negligence, or assumption of risk, or the method for assign-
ing liability among the various defendants. What story would you
tell to your class; or, to put it the other way around, if you were
teaching socratically, what story would you want your class to tell to
you?
You would want to mention the accident itself, of course. You
would want to mention the fact that Harry and Kay Robinson pur-
chased the car from a particular retailer, who received it from a
particular distributor, and you would tell what you knew about the
circumstances of the automobile's design. There are many other facts
that might be worth telling from a substantive point of view. You
might go beyond the most skeletal substantive description in order to
set the background for the story. The Robinsons, it turns out, were
in the process of moving to a new home. 3 ' This is probably not of
any particular legal relevance, but it helps to set the stage. It is the
sort of thing that one might very well include in the story without
the listener simply dismissing it as a digression.
Other factors do seem to be digressions, however. One might,
perhaps, include some discussion of why the Robinsons were moving
(a sick parent? a new job? tired of snow and attracted to the Sunbelt?).
One might even include a subplot about this decision to move (Kay's
employer went bankrupt and she took the new job after reading about
it in the New York Times classified section, because she had heard
that employment opportunities for accountants were really opening up
in the Southwest). At this point we seem to be digressing a fairly
long way from the "real" plot of World-Wide Volkswagen. This notion




to the Plot: 3) Accident
4) Moving to new home, etc.
Digressions: i) Sick parent
2) New job, etc.
In order to use centrality to the plot to identify related contacts,
each of these occurrences can be assigned a geographical location; they
31 These facts are purely hypothetical and are provided for illustrative purposes only.
1988] 1453
HeinOnline -- 101 Harv. L. Rev.  1453 1987-1988
] 3
t l i ti ,
t ts




i li ilit t i t . t t l

























2) j , t .
I r r t s tr lit t t l t t i tif r l t t t ,
f t rr i i l l ti ; t
31 These facts are purely hypothetical and are provided for illustrative purposes only.
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
are contacts with one state or another. Where did the sale take place?
The accident? Where were the Robinsons moving? Where does the
sick parent live? Where is the new job? The suit might arguably be
brought in any one of these states on the grounds that it has some
"connection" with the dispute. The question would be whether the
connection is sufficiently tight that specific jurisdiction analysis is
appropriate.
This weak version of substantive relevance treats as "related" any
facts that are properly part of the story. For instance, if the story
properly included the fact that the Robinsons were moving to Arizona,
then there would be sufficient connection with Arizona that continuous
and systematic contacts sufficient for general jurisdiction would not
have to be shown. Under this view, one would eliminate things that
were patently digressions. Thus it would not count as a contact with
Minnesota, for instance, that the Robinsons were driving through
Oklahoma as they were moving to Arizona because Harry, when he
was a child growing up in Minnesota, had developed a fascination
with the Grand Canyon.
Events i) Design ........ ... (unknown)
Relevant 2) Purchase ....... ... New York
to the Plot: 3) Accident ....... ... Oklahoma Specific
4) Moving to Jurisdiction
new home .... Arizona
Digressions: i) Sick Parent .. ..... New Mexico
2) Place where Harry No
liveal when forming Specific
desire to live in Jurisdiction
Arizona ..... . Minnesota
Is this sense of relatedness the one that Professor Twitchell has in
mind? It is hard to tell, for she has not set out specifically what sort
of connection she would require. Yet her treatment of the Helicop-
teros case suggests that it may capture some or all of her intuition. 32
In Helicopteros, the factors connecting the dispute with Texas were
the negotiations in Texas leading up to the contract in question and
the manufacture and sale in Texas of helicopters and helicopter parts.
Whether these factors are substantively relevant or not in the restric-
tive sense is not easy to say without knowing more about the appli-
cable substantive law. Without this knowledge, I do not consider
Helicopteros a "compelling" case for specific jurisdiction, as Professor
32 See Twitchell, supra note 6, at 639-43.
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Twitchell does. 33 I would want to know more about the substantive
cause of action and whether any of the Texas activities figured into
the merits of the case. But if Professor Twitchell considers these
factors adequately connected to support specific jurisdiction, then per-
haps the reason is that she thinks they are a proper part of the story
of the case.
The weak version of the substantive relevance hypothesis is simply
that any factor alleged as a connection in support of specific jurisdic-
tion must be part of the substantive story underlying the dispute.
Clearly, some line must be drawn to identify those factors that are
sufficiently connected to the forum. Limiting these factors to parts of
the story is a somewhat appealing way to draw the line because it
captures the intuition that "the dispute" must be connected to the
state. After all, what does "the dispute" consist of ? It consists of the
underlying story of the case, ruling out completely fanciful digressions
and including any aspects that a person telling the story might include.
This intuition- explains how there might be a spectrum of easier
and harder cases for personal jurisdiction, even where the elements
of purposefulness and fairness remain constant. It would explain how
Professor Twitchell sees connections with a state as more or less
attenuated;34 the central substantive elements of a dispute are clearly
counted towards specific jurisdiction, whereas other factors are less
probative. This analysis requires that there be some meaningful con-
nection between the dispute and the forum, in the sense that the
plaintiff cannot simply conjure up any event that happened in the
forum and claim that it counts towards specific jurisdiction. Harry
cannot simply choose Minnesota on the basis of his happy childhood
memories. The forum event must be properly a part of the circum-
stances underlying the dispute.
IV. THE STRONGER VERSION: SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL RELEVANCE
Note that construing relatedness in terms of storytelling does em-
phasize the substantive aspects of the dispute. In fact, it is indeed a
version of the substantive relevance test - it just construes "rele-
vance" in an informal, storytelling way. The strong version of the
substantive relevance hypothesis assesses substantive relevance in a
more restrictive sense. It requires that the applicable rules of law
actually make the contact in question one of substantive relevance.
"Relevance" is a legal concept, not a storytelling standard. The mere
fact that one might mention an occurrence in attempting to get to the
33 See id. at 652.
34 See id. at 647-48 (differentiating between contacts out of which the dispute directly arises
and those that are more attenuated).
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
point of the central substantive issues is not enough; the occurrence
must itself make a difference in the dispute's legal treatment.
At the outset, a minor choice-of-law element must be addressed.
Relevance, as those who teach evidence constantly remind their stu-
dents, depends upon the applicable legal rules. 35 Identifying what is
of substantive relevance requires knowing something about what those
legal rules require. It is not enough to take the general view of the
torts professor at a national law school; tort law varies from state to
state. It is for this reason that I initially suggested that the factor in
question must be relevant from the point of view of some state law
that would arguably govern the case. 36 At this threshold point, one
need not make a full-fledged choice of law determination: one need
merely consider the laws reasonably vying for application. Thus, one
might define "relevance" according to some law that ultimately is held
not to govern the case.
Although Professor Twitchell interprets this as a major conces-
sion, 37 it isn't. In the first place, as pointed out earlier, even if the
state does not apply its own law, it is still regulating in-state occur-
rences. Thus, the choice of law problem does not deprive a state of
its claim to regulate the in-state events. The fact remains that some-
thing has occurred within the state that, under one party's version of
the applicable law, is of legal significance. The fact that the court
defers to a colorable claim of substantive relevance is not fatal either.
All that one ever knows at this threshold stage is what the parties
allege; there are many ways in which a finding of jurisdiction may
depend upon assumptions later shown to be mistaken. For instance,
jurisdiction may depend upon factual assumptions that are also part
of the plaintiff's case-in-chief; these factual assumptions may later be
found unwarranted. 38 One does not adjudicate the merits before
deciding whether jurisdiction exists.
Second, it would be extremely unusual for this choice-of-law prob-
lem to make any difference. World-Wide Volkswagen itself illustrates
how choice-of-law concerns are unlikely to matter. The event that
occurred in Oklahoma was the explosion of the car; under any of the
applicable laws, this fact would be relevant. The only situation in
which choice of law would really matter would be where the in-state
occurrence was relevant under one state's law but not under another
35 See, e.g., E. GREEN & C. NESSON, PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE
5-6 (1983).
36 See Brilmayer, supra note 23, at 82-85.
37 See Twitchell, supra note 6, at 656.
38 For example, it may ultimately turn out that a product sent into the forum did not cause
injury there because the product, on the merits, was not the legal cause of the injury. Similarly,
diversity jurisdiction depends upon reasonable allegations that the amount in controversy exceeds
$io,ooo, but these allegations may later turn out to be untrue.
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RELATED CONTACTS
state's law. One can imagine situations of this sort, 39 but I have not
yet encountered them in practice. The problem seems academic rather
than practical.
Having set this objection aside, one should inquire: what are the
advantages of the more restrictive legal relevance standard? One
immediately obvious advantage is that this standard is less vague than
the requirement that a forum occurrence be part of the dispute in the
storytelling sense. One person's plot is another's digression; when one
tries to define precisely what must be told as part of the story, one is
inevitably led back to the notion of substantive legal relevance. The
move to Arizona might figure in some versions of the story, but not
in others. To consider more than the bare substantive bones of the
dispute is to open the door to widely varying notions of what the
dispute is about.
Of course, the mere fact that it is easier to formalize the concept
of legal relevance does not show that it is a superior test. To decide
which test is preferable, one must know the rationale for treating
related and unrelated contacts differently. Why are some contacts
weighted more heavily than others? This is precisely the point at
which Professor Twitchell leaves us guessing. She never explains why
we have two different types of personal jurisdiction in the first place.
Without an understanding of this essential question, it is not surprising
that we are bereft of guidance on how to distinguish between the two.
The test of formal substantive relevance is based upon the notion
that legal norms are designed to regulate conduct and to provide its
legal consequences. A state has an interest in a specific dispute be-
cause some of the activities comprising that dispute occurred within
the state. 40 Adjudication of a dispute is a means towards the legiti-
mate end of regulating local conduct or prescribing its legal conse-
quences. This is the reason why a smaller number of related contacts
suffice for personal jurisdiction; when substantively relevant activities
occur within the forum, the forum has an interest in adjudicating
their consequences. This interest tips the balance towards an assertion
of jurisdiction.
It is true that some activities are "part of the dispute" in the
informal storytelling sense even when they are not of formal substan-
tive relevance. If we again consider the torts professor's perspective,
however, it seems that, even in the substantive sense, unrelated oc-
39 For instance, assume that the plaintiff purchases a drug in state A that injures her, but
it cannot be determined at the time of litigation which defendant was the manufacturer. Under
a "market share" rule, the mere fact of sale in the relevant market could suffice for liability,
although mere sale would not be a relevant basis for liability if the state insisted on proof of
actual causation. If this example seems somewhat strained, the reason is precisely that the
choice-of-law problem is not much of a practical problem at all.
40 See Brilmayer, supra note 23, at 82-85.
1988] 1457
HeinOnline -- 101 Harv. L. Rev.  1457 1987-1988
' ,39 t
i i tely i t e i t t t i t r i l t
t
's
tri t fi r i l t t t l rt f t t r , i
l
t







t t ing ti l ,
t











39 For instance, assu e that the plaintiff purchases a r i state t t i j r r, t
t




40 See Brilmayer, supra note 23, at 82-85.
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
currences are only a means to the end of explaining the factors which
are of substantive relevance. It may be that the Robinson's move to
Arizona is the cause of their presence in Oklahoma at the time of the
accident. But this is not relevant in and of itself; it is relevant only
for explaining a fact that is of legal relevance, namely, the occurrences
in Oklahoma. Arizona, unlike Oklahoma, cannot claim an interest in
adjudicating the dispute by pointing to a desire to regulate local
activities. There are no local activities that Arizona is seeking to
regulate.
It is possible to denigrate the issue of substantive relevance by
characterizing it as simply a matter of pleading. 41 But the fact that
some activity must be pleaded and proven matters, not because plead-
ing itself is important, but because the fact that the activity must be
pleaded and proven reflects concerns of substantive law. Under a test
of substantive relevance, the inquiry must always be into state sub-
stantive policies, and whether they are reflected in its substantive law,
its rules of evidence, or its rules of pleading.
V. OTHER TESTS FOR RELATEDNESS
Professor Twitchell seems to disagree that the local occurrences
which a state has an interest in regulating are those identified by the
applicable substantive laws. She discusses two types of connections,
both of which were suggested briefly in an earlier article of mine and
both of which I rejected as insufficient. 42 One is similarity between
the defendant's in-state activities and the out-of-state activities that
gave rise to the litigation. The second is "but for" or "historical"
causation between the defendant's in-state activities and the out-of-
state activities that gave rise to the litigation. It is unclear whether
she means that these two types of connections are always enough, but
she does reject my claim that they do not substitute for legal rele-
vance. 43 It is fair, then, to ask whether either type of nexus ought to
be sufficient for specific jurisdiction.
Our earlier hypothetical about the auto accident in Massachusetts
illustrates both historical connection and similarity as a basis for
specific jurisdiction. Both Maine and Connecticut have "but for"
historical connections to the dispute, in the sense that "but for" the
trip towards Maine, and "but for" the passage through Connecticut,
the plaintiff would not have been in Massachusetts. Presumably, the
defendant's conduct in Connecticut was also "similar" to the conduct
that gave rise to the cause of action in Massachusetts, although we
41 See Twitchell, supra note 6, at 657 & n.205 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia
v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 427 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
42 See Brilmayer, supra note 23, at 80-8i.
43 See Twitchell, supra note 6, at 66O-6i.
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will see in a moment that this conclusion is not without difficulty.
The similarity is that the defendants drove in Connecticut, and it was
driving that brought about the Massachusetts injury.
Note first that both "but for" historical connection and similarity
are in a sense parasitic upon the notion of substantive relevance. To
what must the forum contacts be "similar"? They must be similar to
the activity that gave rise to the cause of action, namely the Massa-
chusetts driving. With what must they be historically connected?
Again, they must be historically connected to the activities out of
which the dispute arose, namely the Massachusetts activities. Both
of these tests therefore seem to recognize the primacy of substantive
relevance. It is just that they do not restrict specific jurisdiction to
states in which substantively relevant activities occurred. One as-
sumes, therefore, that the justification for basing jurisdiction upon
historically connected facts or similar activities would be likewise
parasitic upon the justification for basing jurisdiction upon contacts
of substantive relevance. Is there such a justification?
At this point, again, it becomes quite crucial to know what Pro-
fessor Twitchell sees as the underlying foundation for personal juris-
diction in the first place. Why should it improve a state's argument
for jurisdiction that the cause of action (which occurred elsewhere) is
based upon a fact pattern similar to things that happened in the
forum? Or that the cause of action has some kind of causal link to
some forum activities, either in the sense that the forum activities
were part of a chain of conduct leading up to the cause of action, or
that the cause of action motivated the forum activities? We shall
examine these two questions in turn.
As a paradigmatic instance of specific jurisdiction based upon
similar forum activities, consider the case of a manufacturer from
state M who directly ships products into the forum (state F) and into
one other state (state A). The products are purchased by consumers
in states F and A, and used there. One of the items sent into state
A malfunctions, causing an accident and injury. Presumably; if the
product that the manufacturer sent into state F had been the one that
caused an injury, that would be an adequate basis for jurisdiction
because the defendant sent it into the forum directly. The "similarity"
argument would be that since the defendant instead sent a similar
product into the state, that would be an adequate basis also.
The intuition supporting jurisdiction would probably be that the
forum has an "interest" in deterring defective manufacture of products,
at least when they are sent into the forum. 44 It is entirely "fortuitous"
that the one sent into state A, rather than the one sent into state F,
was the one that caused the injury.45 Therefore, state F may manifest
44 See id. at 661.
4S See id.
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
its interest in deterring or otherwise regulating the sending of defective
products into the state by requiring that the defendant defend in state
F a products liability case actually arising in state A.
Initially, we must confront a tricky question of what constitutes
adequate similarity. Must it be the identical product that is distrib-
uted? A similar make or model? From the same year? What does
similarity mean in the context of goods that are not mass-produced?
In the context of other sorts, of tort or contract actions? It is obvious
from an example elsewhere in her article that in Professor Twitchell's
view not all forms of similarity will suffice. 46
Implicit in the scenario I have set out also seems to be an as-
sumption that all of the products are equally defective. Would asser-
tion of specific jurisdiction require that a similar product sent into the
forum state have an identical defect? On the one hand, it seems that
it should; for, if hoping to hasten my inheritance, I send a box of
poisoned candy to my wealthy uncle in Wyoming, and a perfectly
innocuous box to my aunt in Arizona, it is hard to see why Arizona
would have any interest in providing a forum for litigation brought
by my uncle when the candy I sent makes him sick. On the other
hand, this complicates the jurisdictional calculus a good bit. The
plaintiff must no longer show merely that there were similar products
in the state, but that they were similarly defective. This raises further
problems about what constitutes a sufficiently similar defect.
Even if we take the case of greatest similarity, it is not at all clear
why a defective product sent into the state but causing no injury is
as strong a basis for jurisdiction as a defective product sent into the
state that does cause injury. Now of course, as Professor Twitchell
says, whether the injury occurred in state A or state F may be
completely fortuitous. 47 But in this sense, all of tort law is based
upon fortuity. If none of the defendant's defectively manufactured
products happens to injure anyone, this also may be a complete
fortuity. But it nonetheless protects the defendant from tort liability.
In some sense, everything that happens, both in the jurisdictional and
the substantive contexts, is fortuitous. One might as well say that
there should be no jurisdiction when the product sent into the forum
is the one that causes the injury, because the fact that someone was
injured is merely fortuitous. Would we denigrate state A's claim to
assert jurisdiction as the place of the accident merely because the fact
that the injury did occur there was pure happenstance?
46 Professor Twitchell discusses the problem of a retired General Motors employee suing GM
in Florida as a case of general jurisdiction. See id. at 670. Yet the Florida activities of General
Motors are "similar" to those leading up to the accident if GM has any employees or other
contractual dealings in Florida; the similarity is that both activities involve employment (or
other contractual) relationships.
47 See id. at 661.
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RELATED CONTACTS
What other reasons might one give for basing jurisdiction on sim-
ilar products that have not caused injury? Certainly the basis for
jurisdiction cannot be either litigational or party convenience. Liti-
gational convenience is not guaranteed, for the activities in the forum
had nothing to do with the cause of action. Product similarity does
not ensure the presence of witnesses or tangible evidence in the forum.
Because events occurring in the forum do not have to be proven in
the litigation - that is, because they are not substantively relevant
- these similar activities will not make the forum an efficient one for
evidentiary purposes. Moreover, the mere fact that similar products
were sent into the forum does not ensure that it will be convenient
for the parties either. Professor Twitchell suggests at one point that
the fact that similar products were sent into the forum may establish
that the defendant has insurance, 48 but whether there is insurance has
nothing to do with whether any similar products are present in the
forum as opposed to in any other location. The existence of some
similar products in any other location would suggest the presence of
insurance just as strongly because large-scale manufacturers are likely
to insure. Insurance may arguably be a reason for expanding personal
jurisdiction generally; however, its existence is made no more likely
by the details of where those products were sent.
Perhaps the real basis for the similarity argument is expectations.
If the defendant has sent similar products into the forum, then it must
have anticipated that it might be subject to suit there if one of those
products were to malfunction, and it would not be surprised to be
sued in the forum on this particular cause of action, even though the
action arose in another state. But this argument does not explain
predicating jurisdiction upon the presence of similar products. First,
why should we assume that, just because the defendant expects to
litigate forum injuries in the forum, he or she will expect to be sued
in the forum for a cause of action that did not arise there? Second,
why should we assume that the defendant's surprise is reduced by
virtue of the fact that the products it sent into the state were similar
to those that actually caused injury elsewhere?
If one assumes that awareness of potential liability to suit on some
cause of action in the forum entails awareness of potential liability on
other causes of action that did not arise in the forum, then one risks
turning specific jurisdiction into general jurisdiction. Under this view,
the defendant should be equally unsurprised by any cause of action
brought against him or her in the forum: the very definition of general
jurisdiction.
The problem with the expectations argument is that it ignores the
difficult question: surprise as to what? Surprise depends upon how one
48 See id.
1988] 1461
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describes the defendant's expectations. One might say, "Having
shipped products into state F, the defendant expects to be subject to
suit there." Or one might say, "Having shipped products into state
F, the defendant expects to be subject to suit there if one of those
products injures someone in state F." Or one might say, "Having
shipped products into state F, the defendant expects to be subject to
suit there if a similar product injures someone anywhere in the coun-
try." The first phrasing of the defendant's expectations results in
general jurisdiction, since the defendant's expectations are phrased in
a "dispute-blind" way. The second leads only to jurisdiction over
injuries actually occurring in the forum. The third leads to "dispute-
specific" jurisdiction based upon similar circumstances.
More generally, all expectations arguments are incomplete bases
for jurisdiction. If state F explicitly notifies me that I will henceforth
be subject to personal jurisdiction in F in all cases in which I might
be a defendant, I may adjust and act on my expectations accordingly
- by procuring insurance, for example. But this does not make
jurisdiction in state F fair. The question is, why does state F have a
right to impose such a burden upon me? If state F exercises jurisdic-
tion over me in cases that arise in state A, then the fact that I have
been led to expect this seems beside the point. The relevant question
is, may state F condition entry into its markets upon subjection to
jurisdiction over actions involving events occurring elsewhere?
In fairness to Professor Twitchell, I should acknowledge that al-
lowing dispute-specific analysis of a broad range of cases does not
mean - even under her view - that jurisdiction will exist in all of
those cases. The next step seems to be a generalized fairness analysis,
and at this point she might even take substantive relevance into
account. 49 The problem is that relying so heavily upon some subse-
quent generalized fairness analysis simply shifts the inquiry towards
this second stage of analysis, which remains quite amorphous and
itself has no clear foundation. We still have no answer to the question
of why similarity makes dispute-specific analysis appropriate, nor can
we evaluate the results produced by such an analysis because we
simply do not know what they will be.
Much of what has just been said about the similarity test for
related contacts can also be said about historical connection or "but
for" causation. Note first that although it bears some resemblance to
our earlier test of inclusion in the plot line, it is actually more elastic.
For example, it is a "but for" cause of the accident that the defendant
and plaintiff were born: does this mean that specific jurisdiction anal-
ysis is appropriate in their states of birth, even if they left them years
ago? One would probably not include the circumstances of the defen-
49 See id. at 663.
1462 [Vol. 1oi:1444







." i t's ti s
i ti , '
l
i ti n .
i s
ti . rt
i i tion t
, l
j i i ti
i t t
ti i i i ,
i , ti t i
j i i ti ti i l i
r ll, l
l i is t -s ific l sis f r r f t
- r r i - t t j i i ti ill i t i ll
t . t t t li
t i t t
49
t r li i l i i l i t
t is s st f l sis, i r i it r
it lf l r f ti . till r t t ti
f si il rit s i t - ifi l i r ri te,
l t t lt
t j t it
r l t t ts ls s i t i t ri l ti r t
ti . t
r rli r t t i l i i t l t , .
r l , it is t f r f t i t t t t t
l i tiff i ti




dant's birth in recounting the facts leading up to the litigation; place
of birth therefore flunks the test of plot-inclusion. Like similarity,
historical connection is an enormously expansive test. Are all states
having "but for" connections with the dispute relieved from the obli-
gation to establish "continuous and systematic" connections and in-
stead allowed to employ the more lenient standard for specific juris-
diction?
Finally, it seems that neither of these tests is consistent with the
two cases in which the Supreme Court has directly addressed the issue
of what constitutes an appropriate nexus for specific jurisdiction. In
Shaffer v. Heitner50 and Rush v. Savchuks l the Court applied the
requirement that property must be related to the dispute in order to
establish jurisdiction. In Shaffer, the connection between the property
and the dispute was that the plaintiff in a derivative suit held stock
in the defendant corporation within the forum state.5 2 In Rush, the
property in question was the contractual obligation of the defendant's
insurer to defend a suit arising out of an auto accident.5 3
Both assertions of jurisdiction seem to be "dispute-specific" in the
sense that Professor Twitchell requires; the arguments in favor of
litigation in that particular forum support jurisdiction over some
causes of action more strongly than others. But both assertions of
jurisdiction were invalidated by the Supreme Court. In Rush, the
Court pointed out that the insurance policy was not related to the
"operative facts" of the litigation;5 4 this phrasing suggests support for
a test of substantive relevance. Furthermore, in Rush it is not difficult
to argue some "but for" relationship between the property and the
litigation.55 People buy auto insurance in order to protect themselves
against litigation such as the suit in question, and also because some
states require it as a condition for driving on the open road. The
defendant might never have had the accident and might not have
been worth suing if he had not had insurance.
The challenge is to devise a test that shows why the property in
Rush and Shaffer was "unrelated," or else to offer some alternative
theory about relatedness that explains why those cases were wrongly
decided. If one is to maintain that there is a difference between
general and specific jurisdiction, or to use Professor Twitchell's ter-
minology, between dispute-blind and dispute-specific jurisdiction, then
so 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
51 444 U.S. 320 (198O).
52 See 433 U.S. at I89-9o.
53 See 444 U.S. at 322.
54 See id. at 329.
55 Justice Brennan makes this argument in his Rush dissent, which appears in a companion
case. See World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 303 n.6 (198o) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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one must have some sort of explanation for why two types of juris-
diction exist. Such an explanation would help identify those disputes
that are sufficiently connected to the forum for the court to apply the
more lenient test for specific jurisdiction, and those that must meet
the more restrictive "continuous and systematic" test.
It used to be so easy. The ground-breaking work of Professors
von Mehren and Trautman dealt with the easy cases for general and
specific jurisdiction, cases in which there was a clear connection be-
tween the dispute and forum or in which it was clear that no such
connection existed. The luxury of focusing on easy cases is a luxury
that we don't have any more. Notwithstanding the remaining prob-
lems discussed above, we should be grateful that another scholar,
Professor Twitchell, has seen fit to enter this controversy; we should
eagerly anticipate her continued involvement and further investiga-
tions.
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